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Introduction
In many situations of monitoring, the number of actual detections does not unambiguously reveal the underlying level of misbehavior. For example, when a division head of a large company reports to cooperate headquarters a low number of violations against some corporate code of conduct for his division (e.g., not accepting bribes), it is not obvious what this information reveals about the true level of misbehavior in the division. The reason is that a low number of detections could either result from a strict monitoring policy leading to few offenders only, most of which are detected (black sheep). Instead, the monitoring policy could be lax, leading to a large number of offenders, out of which only few (scapegoats) are discovered. As a further example, in sports competitions it is hard to judge for outsiders what a given number of detected dopers reveals about the seriousness and intensity of anti-doping measures by the respective agencies and the virulence of doping among athletes. Further examples include victimless crime such as prostitution, trafficking or drug dealing, where the number of arrests might not be too informative about the prevalence of an illegal activity.
The common feature of these examples is that an authority delegates the task of monitoring a population of individuals to an agent. Thereby, it is an outsider in the sense that it can neither observe the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior.
1 In contrast, the potential offenders have a good assessment of the monitoring policy (i.e., the probability of being detected) which is a standard assumption in the economic literature on enforcement (see e.g., Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) .
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We develop a simple model which captures the interaction between the authority, the 1 The feature that several monitoring intensities lead to the same number of detections also applies to further settings such as tax evasion, education or loan audits. However, it is less clear in these contexts that the authority can be considered as an outsider who has to rely on the number of reported detections only.
monitoring agent and potential offenders, and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of a given monitoring policy. Intuitively, when several monitoring intensities give rise to the same level of detected offenses, then a utility maximizing agent can only be induced to choose the minimum of these. 3 Hence, under quite general conditions (for example, with respect to the underlying distribution of individuals' gains from the offense or the agent's effort cost function), a large set of monitoring policies cannot be implemented by the authority, even if it had unlimited funds to reward the inspector.
Model
There are three types of players: a population of individuals who are potential offenders, an inspector who monitors them, and an outside governor who incentivizes the inspector.
Individuals
There is a unit mass of individuals who differ with respect to their gain from committing an offense, g i , where the cumulative distribution of these gains is denoted by G : R → [0, 1], and which is continuous and strictly increasing. Following the tradition of Becker (1968) , we assume that for a given probability of detection p ∈ [0, 1], and a (exogenous) penalty T > 0, each individual will commit the offense if and only if its gain g i exceeds the expected costs p · T . This leads to a threshold g := p · T , such that all
, which is strictly decreasing in p.
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Inspector The inspector chooses the monitoring intensity p ∈ [0, 1] which equals the probability each offender is detected with. Monitoring is costly for the inspector, which We study a context where the inspector can only be rewarded on the basis of the number of detections D(p), which is observable. Denoting the monetary reward by R(D(p)),
Governor The governor remunerates the inspector by setting a payment scheme R(D(p)),
without being able to verify the inspector's actual behavior (p) or the crime level (F (p)).
For our purpose, it is not necessary to specify explicitly the preferences of the governor, for example, with regards to her distaste for crime. Rather, we assume that the governor aims at implementing some desired monitoring intensityp. For instance,p could indeed be her privately optimal choice or, alternatively, the socially efficient level which results when taking into account the preferences of all involved individuals, including the gains and the harm from the offense.
Implementable Monitoring Policies
We now analyze under which circumstances the governor can successfully induce the inspector to choosep, i.e. find payments R such thatp ∈ arg max p u(p). For any given level of detections d ∈ ∆, define an ordered set of monitoring intensities
Importantly, while the number of detected offenses is equal to d for all p 
), respectively. Denote by P 1 the set containing all minimum monitoring intensities, that is,
Theorem 1. A desired monitoring policyp is implementable if and only ifp ∈ P 1 . The resulting set of implementable monitoring policies
Proof. Forp ∈ P 1 there is ap ∈ P 1 such that 
The result is illustrated in Figure 1 . In special cases there is a unique monitoring intensity associated with a given number of (observable) detections such that implementability is not an issue. 7 Otherwise, when P d is not a singleton, the inspector has a choice between several monitoring regimes in order to generate d detections (see Figure 1 ). For example, he can either choose a low monitoring effort p given number of detections d ∈ ∆ at the lowest cost, and so his optimal choice is p d 1 . As a consequence, only monitoring policies p ∈ P 1 can be implemented so thatp ∈ P 1 is a necessary condition for its implementation. As for sufficiency, all monitoring levelŝ p ∈ P 1 can be implemented by sufficiently rewarding the corresponding detection level
Importantly, Theorem 1 renders all p > p m non-implementable, which means that the level of misbehavior is larger than F (p m ). This suggests that detected offenders might be better classified as scapegoats rather than as black sheep. The result can also be expressed in terms of the elasticity of crime e(p) : ]. As a result,
), which gives rise to a set of implementable
]. Under the realistic assumption that more than half of the population should be deterred, the respective desired monitoring policy (i.e. somê p > 1 2
) cannot be implemented.
Discussion
In our simple model, inspectors cannot be induced to choose monitoring intensities beyond the threshold p m , so that detected offenders tend to be scapegoats rather than black sheep.
In this respect Theorem 1 is very general in the sense that it holds for any payment scheme R(D(p)) which the governor might use and for any specification of the crime function F (p).
We only require that more monitoring effort is more costly for the inspector.
In the basic setup, the inspector is not personally affected by the crime level. While this assumption seems plausible in many applications, it can be relaxed, for example by considering a utility function u(p, β) = R(D(p)) + βF (p) − C(p), where β measures the inspector's net utility from crime. Benefits of crime can arise, for example, from accepting bribes, and disutility can be caused by intrinsic motivation to keep the crime level low.
Interestingly, inspectors with a sufficiently strong intrinsic motivation (i.e. β << 0) can be induced to implement monitoring policies (p > p m ), which are not implementable in the basic set-up. However, this remedy relies on the assumption that the governor can observe the inspector's β-type.
As a further extension, β could also be the inspector's private information. In contrast to standard screening models, the resulting design problem for the governor becomes significantly more intricate because of additional incentive and participation constraints. This is again due to the fact that multiple monitoring intensities give rise to the same number of detections, which increases the scope of mimicking.
